

7

Living in a World of Change and Constancy

Globalization, Citizenship and Youth

Introduction

Chapter 7 covers a wide-ranging and contested area, namely that of globalization and citizenship, and the significance of these for youth and young people. A number of key questions are asked. What is the relationship between globalization and citizenship? Do the two 'cross-cut' one another? Is citizenship restricted to the nation state? Is it possible to be a global citizen? Does *economic* globalization preclude (or enhance) *social* citizenship?

All these questions have been hotly disputed in politics and currently in sociology. The literature here is extensive and the area is explored by focusing on the perspectives and approaches, and particular questions that are most relevant to young people and the concept of youth. However, it is no exaggeration to suggest that *all* debates on these topics are relevant to children and young people, as they will inherit the world that emerges from current processes and developments. Citizenship is now an aspect of the curriculum in UK schools, so the exploration is concluded with a very brief consideration of the role of education in this area.

In this chapter, *citizenship* and *globalization* are the main ideas discussed. However, because the concepts themselves are contested, and this is the very substance of the debates, the chapter does *not* begin with a one or two-line definition of each. Instead, characterizations of both concepts and the relationship between them will emerge throughout the chapter. Nevertheless it is worth offering a preliminary outline of both concepts.

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Write down what you understand the term *citizenship* to mean. Don't think too long about it – just write down the first few things that come into your head.

As you proceed through this chapter, check back on these initial thoughts and see how they relate to the various discussions and debates.

As a concept, citizenship emerged in classical times in ancient Greece and applied to members of the city-state of Athens. There, certain social groups were not permitted to be citizens: women and slaves, for example. In its current, *liberal* form, citizenship signifies something quite different, referring to the *legitimate and equal membership of a society*. In the classical world, citizenship was 'obligation-based' rather than 'rights-based'. This reminds us of the 'rights and responsibilities' arguments of Third Way politics. The duality or social contract underlying citizenship discourse, that citizenship has two sides to it, rights *and* responsibilities, has been very important.

Citizenship is a concept that has been deployed historically by a range of groups, including anti-slavery campaigners, the women's movement, civil rights movements, and gay activists. The detailed definition of the concept will be contingent upon the perspective of the particular defining group. The task here is to advance an understanding of these different characterizations of citizenship, particularly in its relationship with globalization. Prior to that, the chapter briefly considers the question of change.

As earlier chapters have suggested, sociology has been preoccupied with the changes implied in the shift from *traditional* to *modern* societies, and the term *late modernity* has been used to signal contemporary times. When sociologists talk about change they refer to aspects of historical discontinuity and, in this, the concept of youth has special significance in Western societies. The universalization of youth as a social category occurred partly in relation to its value as a metaphor for making sense of social change. Questions about youth have been asked since the mid-nineteenth century, in order to evaluate the nature and condition of contemporary or future society. The post-war obsession in Western societies with youth in both working-class and middle-class forms (subculture and counterculture respectively) has reflected deep anxieties about social change in those societies and, as Davis argues, images of troubled and troublesome youth have 'come to stand in a kind of projective relationship to the formulation and

diagnoses of the nature and implications of social change itself' (Davis, 1990: 217). Arguably, the extent of *actual* intergenerational conflict and social dysfunction in these societies has been overstated: despite some aspects of culture, beliefs and values clearly shifting, other elements remain constant and continuous. Nevertheless, the sense of change is strong in late modern societies. Sociologists have tended to describe change in terms of relatively unambiguous breaks between, say, tradition and modernity, or pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies. The actual experience of change is much more uneven than these breaks suggest, and is entangled with aspects of continuity through which the social world is maintained and reproduced.

It is possible to think of social change as a polarity between changes that might be seen as *seismic* or *incremental*. The 1889 French and 1917 Russian Revolutions, or events in North Africa in 2011, were *seismic*: violent, rapid and politically motivated, resulting in totally reconfigured social orders. On the other hand, aspects of the shifts from feudalism to capitalism have been largely *incremental*, slower and more piecemeal, often responding to technological innovations which have entailed adjustments to social practices and relations.

Sociologists offer different accounts of social change that have attempted to analyse the process of modernization. Tonkiss (1998) outlines a useful typology (see Table 7.1).

Sociologists' exclusive focus on a modernity characterized in terms of change and complexity has contrasted with their view of traditional or pre-modern societies as distinctly *other*, conservative and implicitly lacking or backward. This has been especially so in relation to non-Western societies. The dominance of a particular account of modernity has also often failed to acknowledge the coexistence of *traditional* and *modern* aspects in one society (Tonkiss, 1998: 46). In contemporary China and India, for example, traditional and modern forms of social organization coexist, sometimes in conflict. Globalization means that both modern and traditional economies are brought into relationship.

Globalization operates at a number of different levels and a preliminary definition is offered from Ritzer who suggests that globalization is:

... a transplanetary *process* or set of *processes* increasing *liquidity* and the growing multidirectional *flows* of people, objects, places and information as well as the structures they encounter and create that are *barriers* to, or *expedite*, those flows. (Ritzer and Atalay, 2010: 1)

Broadly speaking, the processes of globalization signify increased connectedness between societies in different parts of the world and the

Table 7.1 Processes of social change

Change as evolutionary	This is modelled on a natural science account of change that suggests processes of increasing differentiation, specialization and adaptation across time through which new social forms emerge. Society, in this account, is understood as a social totality, a complex entity or system in itself. Growth and integration are key ideas here. This model can miss the unequal or local distribution of change, leading to social inequality
Functionalist change	Functionalism takes the metaphor of society as a living organism (a biological metaphor) that adapts to changing conditions; society is self-stabilizing to create 'steady state' conditions in its interdependent sub-systems and structures: economy, polity, social institutions and culture
Change and conflict	This account is a response to functionalist models, stressing dynamic social conflict and crisis, and the importance of revolutionary movements and agents instigating change. It points to the internal and systemic contradictions in a society to which resistance and change (instigated by social classes, for example) are inevitable responses. The Russian and French Revolutions are examples
Non-linear change	The three accounts above rely on a linear logic of <i>progress</i> . In contrast, non-linear approaches to change have used alternative explanations that entail cyclical or 'rise and fall' narratives (e.g. economic boom and bust, post-war recessions, the Depression of the 1930s). Foucault's account of the emergence of discourse (knowledge that organizes aspects of social life: such as sexuality, punishment, health and hygiene) suggests contingent, unpredictable and localized aspects of change, challenging models of systemic change that characterize the three accounts above

Source: Adapted from Tonkiss (1998)

apparent diminishing or liquidizing of boundaries, particularly those of nation states so that finance, people, ideas, goods, information and culture flow between them. The structures to which Ritzer and Atalay refer could be those imposed by nation states (for example immigration controls) or transnational organizations (for example the United Nations) that either restrict or enable those flows.

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Much of the literature on globalization refers to the idea of flow; of people, culture, information and so on, that seem to characterize its processes. Can you think of examples from your own experience that seem to support the idea of 'flow' on a global scale? You might want to think about popular culture here and how many young people worldwide become embedded in an increasingly globalized youth culture.

A further example is the flow of sports people and ideas across the global sporting arena. Consider, for example, the footballers currently playing for British or Italian teams and how the management of football has also become globalized. This suggests that management expertise similarly flows through international football. Tactics that have, in the past, perhaps been associated with top English or Italian teams, for example, are now commonplace.

Globalization

Globalization and citizenship could be set in opposition to each other particularly because it might be argued that citizenship *needs* the nation state. It might be suggested that the very concept of citizenship is conditional upon the existence, and strength, of the nation state whose power has been altered, even undermined and eroded by globalization. The *extent* to which globalization has eroded the power of the nation state is strongly contested (Guillén, 2001: 247–51). In arguing the complexity and uneven effects of globalization, some authors (for example Sassen, 2006) suggest that neoliberal economic globalization actually *enhances* the power of some parts of the state, including the executive and regulatory bodies, and weakens others, especially the legislature in which democracy in the liberal nation state is embodied and realized. However, other authors argue that the flows (including those of multinational corporate capital: the banks and business generally) are able to resist the capacity and authority of the nation state to control or regulate them. Indeed, supranational bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulate global capital and deal mainly with executive government that then becomes thoroughly *internationalized*. The power of the executive (that is, of the government) has also been enhanced in the post-9/11 era, although the accretion of power in this case is separate from that which is the consequence of increasingly globalized economic organization. Overall, this argument suggests shifting power relations *between* nation states as well

as *within* them (Sassen, 2006). These arguments have real implications for how public services, including those for young people, are funded in any given nation state. For some politicians, globalization seems to have become an excuse for not meeting the expectations of electorates or for presenting some policy strategies as the inevitable consequence of globalization (Hirst and Thompson, 1999).

It appears, at least superficially, that nation states have less obvious power than at times in the past. National boundaries have become extremely porous. At the very least, there is considerable awareness and understanding of events taking place beyond national boundaries (globalized media have ensured this: look at the influence and reach of CNN, Fox News, or Al Jazeera). However, it does seem that there is more to this than greater public awareness of global events. At the level of the corporation, multinationalism and transnationalism are becoming almost commonplace. The ubiquitous McDonald's fast food outlets that have appeared in almost every major world city exemplify this. Financial transactions are conducted at a global level and growth in international trade has created an increasing interdependency across nations, almost continuously increasing since 1950. While international trade and flows of capital are not a new phenomenon (consider the Roman Empire, the fifteenth and sixteenth century Spanish or Portuguese explorations of the world, or England's imperial and colonial expansion from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries; perhaps all examples of globalization?), it is the level and nature of these flows that has prompted many commentators to describe the current situation in terms of globalization. Although there is lively debate among sociologists and others about the nature of globalization and even whether globalization exists at all, there seems to be general and popular acceptance that globalization *is* real and that the world is becoming increasingly interrelated.

Those who challenge this position suggest that globalization is neither unprecedented nor as embedded as many seem to suggest. They argue that because trade and foreign investment are concentrated in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim, what is *actually* going on is best characterized as a process of internationalization rather than globalization, as many countries are simply not involved. Guillén (2001) calls this the 'feebleness argument'. It is about capital and finance and omits the significance of what has come to be regarded as *cultural* globalization involving popular music, sport and ideas.

In broad summary, some of the questions that would need to be addressed in exploring the idea of globalization can be identified. For the purpose of this discussion you can think of globalization as the intersection of a number of key factors or forces: those shown in Table 7.2 are generally identified as important.

Table 7.2 Globalization

Factors	Characteristics and positions
Time-space compressions	Distance becomes less significant as the world metaphorically speeds up: travel across distance becomes easier and quicker; mass travel enables many people to experience different cultures first hand; electronic media bring other times and places 'into the living room'
Cultural and technological flows beyond borders	National borders become more permeable and people, ideas, technologies, information, cultural and symbolic resources (film, literature, music, and other forms of cultural expression) flow across 'borderless states'
Interconnection and interdependency	Nation states become increasingly embedded in systems of global finance and trade relations; complex relations of dependency and interdependency; social networking across boundaries and borders: Facebook, Inter-Pals, Bebo, etc. creating a sense of 'common humanity'
Networks of powerful transnational actors and organizations	These are of different kinds: transnational corporations (TNCs) such as Unilever, Sony, BP and the major supermarkets such as Tesco and Walmart have enormous market power and establish networks of trade relations through global supply chains; new bodies upholding international law (e.g. the International Criminal Court in the Hague or the European Court of Human Rights) to which nation states are increasingly accountable; international governmental organizations such as the IMF or WTO; the growth of globalized social movements and diasporas
Common world problems	A range of environmental, ecological and health factors in the form of acknowledged patterns of 'risk' shape the experiences of people in different countries: HIV/AIDS; global warming

Despite the proliferation of this activity across (most of) the globe, these globalized processes do not supplant the activities of nation states. Although the processes associated with the contents of Table 7.2 are abstract and, literally, *global* in character, they are mediated in terms of the *local*. In a country of 60 million such as the UK, the local might signify something quite different from its meaning in a country of 400,000 people,

such as Malta. The mediation of the global by the local means that young people's *lived experiences* of globalization always entail a kind of *relay* between global and local factors.

Let us try to give a substantive example of this. On a recent trip to Uganda (part of the world increasingly accessible through cheap air travel), we met a group of young people in a small village in the western part of the country, next to the Congolese border. This was a part of Uganda referred to by Ugandan colleagues as 'up-country', meaning that, to all intents and purposes, it was remote, largely undeveloped in commercial or industrial terms and, in many respects, organized on traditional lines with families and very localized communities being important social institutions. These were linked in to the Ugandan model of local governance. Work in the area was organized around agriculture and the production of cassava, banana and plantain. However, all sorts of cultural artefacts originating from 'the West' had penetrated this apparently 'traditional culture'. One of the young men was wearing a Crystal Palace football shirt and although his English was limited (and my knowledge of Luganda non-existent) he was able to demonstrate a real knowledge and enthusiasm for the team, its players and its recent achievements. The shirt served as a point of contact between us and generated warmth and a degree of mutuality around a shared interest in football. Other young people there were listening to American-style hip-hop music and wore baseball caps and trainers that would not have been out of place in south London or New York.

What might be occurring here is a kind of *hybrid* of different cultures that form a link between this tiny village in Africa with London and the US. The young people's experience of the music they listen to or their enthusiasm for an English football team, and in particular the symbolic aspects of these that carry their globalized meanings, was inevitably mediated through their local setting: their location in traditional familial and community structures and their social and cultural relations. The symbolic significance of the Nike or Adidas tee shirt, the trainer logos, the Crystal Palace shirt and the music, and their meaning for local youth culture was constructed and reconstructed in the local setting. Nevertheless, these cultural artefacts formed a connection, however attenuated, between very different cultural traditions and worlds.

It is important to acknowledge the potentially 'two-way' (more appropriately *multidirectional*) traffic of globalization, at least in terms of popular culture. The Uganda example above suggests that American and UK cultural artefacts travel outwards from those cultural hubs. There are sociologists who argue that globalization should best be understood as part of the long history of what has been seen as the cultural threat of Americanization through 'Coca-Colonization': Naomi Klein's *No Logo* (2000) is a well-known example. However, Klein critically acknowledges how a new

'mono-multiculturalism' has shifted the cultural imperialism associated with American global marketing.

Today the buzzword in global marketing isn't selling America to the world, but bringing a kind of market masala to everyone in the world. (Klein, 2000: 117)

There are, however, instances of cultural forms that travel in other directions than West–East. The Japanese *manga* and *anime* comic genres could be seen as an important Eastern influence on the West. This cultural traffic, in turn, might also be understood as a reprise of the nineteenth-century cult of *Japonism* (although there are much earlier seventeenth-century examples of the influence of Japanese art in Europe) in which highly coloured, dramatic and *exotic* wood block images of Japanese life and scenes from the Kabuki theatre became highly valued in Europe. Japonism was also influential in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century music, particularly through operas by Puccini (*Madame Butterfly*) and Gilbert and Sullivan (*The Mikado*). Manga's influence on recent and contemporary Western youth culture can be seen in the popularity of J-Pop music and the so-called 'Gothic-Lolita' aesthetic. Japanese street fashion has been popular in the UK for a long time: ASICS, Uniqlo and Superdry brands are well-known examples. There is a significant literature on these forms, including Gravett (2004) who offers a history of manga, Kinsella (2000) who identifies the gendered and racialized aspects of manga and anime, and Napier (2008) who offers an account of Japan and Japanese cultures as the focus of Western imagination and fantasy. Perhaps the point to make there is that these cultural products (in the nineteenth century and contemporarily) have acquired the cachet to become seen as cultural capital through the processes of global movement and flow.

The interesting sociological questions here in relation to both the early cults of Japonism and their later reincarnations through manga and anime concern the underlying interest in the *exotic* and, perhaps in *the exotic other*, that seem to drive these phenomena and the diverse ways in which these form or shape youth cultures and subcultures. Edward Said's well-known book *Orientalism* (1991) identified a widespread and persistent European racism focused on the Arab/Islamic world. Said argued that orientalism became a pervasive ideology shaped by imperialist assumptions of Western rationalism and cultural superiority. The Orient was seen as somehow immune from the processes of modernization that have created contemporary Western institutions and was seen as exotic, mysterious and somehow backward. The point about Said's work is that it identifies the processes and practices that create and sustain particular representations of the 'other' (and implicitly, 'us').

Perhaps there are aspects of these imaginative and representational practices underlying the current fascination with manga and anime where the cultural other becomes understood through these practices. However, these

are complex questions precisely because how these cultural commodities travel is not always clear or, indeed, linear. American cartoon forms and styles inspired the original manga cartoons in the 1950s so the overall direction of cultural travel could be seen as two-way. Inevitably, these original forms become altered and hybridized in the process (Pieterse, 2010: 347).

This means, as Gidley points out (2007: 147), that simplistic arguments that suggest the globalization of culture (whether American, British or Japanese) can be understood as just another form of cultural imperialism, a specific nation or culture seeking to dominate and exploit other cultures economically or in other ways, should be rejected. Yet, the sheer market power and influence of global players such as Walmart, Coca-Cola or Tesco must be acknowledged. Cultural traffic is increasingly multidirectional and, as Gidley indicates, cultural products and artefacts are not consumed passively. Rather, as with the young people in the example from Uganda, they are adapted and combined with local cultural forms and practices to produce new and, potentially, enlivened entities.

The concept of globalization invites us to imagine a world that goes way beyond the proximate aspects of our lives that might be understood as 'near' or 'local'. In a famous essay, *The Stranger*, the early twentieth-century sociologist Georg Simmel looked at the relationship between the stranger (exemplified for Simmel by the European Jew but there are contemporary equivalents such as the international student, the refugee or the asylum seeker) and the group. Simmel suggested that the stranger's mobility and presence in one's local communities generated a kind of 'synthesis of nearness and remoteness' (Simmel, 1971: 145). In that sense, like Simmel, imagining a world beyond that understood as near cannot be avoided: the presence of the stranger ensures that everyone is made perpetually aware of the global in the local. One only has to travel through a city centre by metro or bus to see the extent to which the metro carriage becomes the synthesis of 'near and far' to which Simmel refers. For Simmel, as for contemporaries, the presence of the stranger signalled the capacity of societies to change by absorbing newness, thus becoming revitalized. This is forgotten when discussions of globalization focus solely on the stranger as threat.

Whatever else globalization signals, the idea of mobility is extremely important. Mobility implies the *physical* capacity to move around. For example, it gets easier and easier to travel rapidly to new places for holidays, commuters travel ever-greater distances to work; Americans have been accused of routinely sending prisoners from the Middle East to various countries where US surrogates extract information from them through torture (and there are accusations of the British being complicit in this); and refugees and asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa arrive in Europe in increasing numbers.

As well as physical mobility, there are also aspects of *virtual* mobility that have developed as a consequence of new networking capacities using information and communication technologies. Castells (2009) argues that the global is constituted in the articulation of network technologies, the spaces defined by networks and the people who control them, often powerful and protected elites.

For Castells, globalization is constituted principally in the global flow of finance, and power has come to be lodged in the networks of information through which political (small 'p') control is secured. He suggests that power itself has changed little; its sources and forms remain 'violence and discourse, coercion and persuasion, political domination and cultural framing' (ibid: 50). However, the environment in which power is exercised *has* altered and is now characterized by the articulation of global and local elements in the context of the network.

Castells' arguments, however, are broader than simply thinking about globalization in the abstract. He is also concerned with contested political legitimacy (trust in politicians is at an all time low, voter turnout at elections is almost universally diminishing and some political constituencies have come to rely on celebrity politicians – Schwarzenegger and Reagan come to mind immediately). The point here, for Castells, is that there exists a worldwide crisis of political legitimacy. He adds to this the tendency towards the fragmentation of traditional political constituencies (for example the association between social class and political parties or trade unions), increasing social mobility and processes of individualization and he suggests that a growing fissure exists between citizens and politics.

However, Castells also wants to suggest how the networks that constitute globalization can, in principle, also contribute to revitalizing political life. He shows, for example, that in the 2008 election in the US youth mobilization increased for the third election running and that this was partially a consequence of re-imagining and reprogramming communication networks (the 'Yes We Can' campaign, that was virally distributed, for example) to ensure that young Americans were registered to vote and did so in large numbers for Obama. Castells argues that digitally based communication networks have the capacity to re-establish political legitimacy by forming connections between the 'powerless segments of the population to power-making procedures' (Castells, 2009: 366). Youth is one of those relatively powerless segments.

A slightly different take on globalization is offered by the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai who has developed the idea of contemporary (global) society being constituted by a series of what he refers to as 'scapes' (an article on Appadurai's analysis can be found here: http://www.intcul.tohoku.ac.jp/~holden/MediatedSociety/Readings/2003_04/Appadurai.html).

Appadurai suggests, in common with Castells, that global capitalism has deeply fragmenting tendencies and that social life can now be understood as a series of cultural flows that shape a highly mobile and shifting world. These he defines in five ways: ethnoscaples, mediascaples, technoscaples, finanscaples and ideoscaples (see Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 The globalized world: 'scapes'

Ethnoscaples	The landscape of people who form the shifting global world: e.g. tourists, refugees, guest workers, exiles and travellers
Mediascaples	The media images of the world (with which we are perpetually bombarded: films, adverts, 'world music' and digital records of all kinds) through which we understand and 'imagine' the world around us
Technoscaples	Technology's capacity to move across borders according to politics, finance and the availability of labour to become structured in global configurations (military hardware, computer games and medicines, for example)
Finanscaples	The global flow of money and finance through currency markets, stock exchanges and various mechanisms of speculation (e.g. hedge funds)
Ideoscaples	The global flows of messages, ideas and ideology, the latter shaping conflicts between state ideologies and the counter-ideologies of social movements challenging for power

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Let us try to place this in a more concrete setting. If we return to the example of Uganda referred to earlier, we can begin to see some evidence of the ways in which these flows of culture and 'cultural stuff' become evident. We can identify at least three aspects of this.

First, one might think about the ways in which the Ugandan ethnoscape was constructed. In the village, there were people from different parts of the country and the world: locals, for example, were immediately evident. Stories of refugees and militia members from the

nearby Democratic Republic of Congo had been recounted earlier that day. My own presence as a white man, a traveller, from the North of the globe also contributed to the construction of a hybridized and differentiated space. Second, aspects of a mediascape might be identified: the Crystal Palace shirt, the discussion of US hip-hop music and its influence on contemporary music-making in Uganda and the logos on trainers and tee shirts are all examples of these flows of media and this is certainly not one-way traffic. Contemporary African music is consumed almost voraciously in the North as part of the broad interest in so-called 'world music'. Third, elements of the technoscape to which Appadurai refers are evident as well. The MP3 or CD player that one of the young men was using is an example of technology (cheap and available) flowing through borders and shaping the collective culture of which it becomes a part. The CD itself is another example. And we should remember that these developments have occurred alongside the continuing presence of tradition in the form of indigenous musical forms. Look at MP3 Mandomix, for example, for lots of examples of 'cross-over' forms.

You might like to try to extend the analysis here and work out what might count as examples of finanscapes and ideoscapes. The point about all of this is that these cultural flows embed the global firmly within the local.

Appadurai suggests that these *scapes* represent a series of shifting horizons or cultural streams where apparently disjointed elements become the resources and settings in which contemporary humans imagine and make their lives in global settings. For Appadurai, it is these scapes (as imagined worlds) that create interconnections and potential solidarities. They demonstrate that borders and boundaries are no longer impenetrable. However, this raises questions of whether some borders are impenetrable to *some* groups or populations. Which groups have access and which are prevented? For *whom* are borders open and for *whom* are they closed?

Whatever else can be said about globalization, the constancy of mobility and movement is always present. As Bauman (1998) suggests, people are perpetually on the move even as they sit in front of computer screens effortlessly moving from one space to another as virtual tourists, visitors and travellers. Perhaps, as some analysts have suggested, this is conducive to the development of *global citizenship*?

Globalization and citizenship

Despite the debates, the definition of globalization suggested by Ritzer and Atalay with which this chapter began is broad enough to use as a kind of working definition that includes several key elements:

- transplanetary process or set of processes
- increasing liquidity
- multidirectional flows of people, objects, places and information
- barriers to, or which expedite, those flows.

What then of the relationship between globalization and citizenship? These two concepts are related because they raise questions of human rights and obligations held through membership of a body politic in a changing and mobile world. The classical liberal theory of T.H. Marshall, which has been very high profile in debates about citizenship in the UK and similar liberal democracies, identifies three routes to national citizenship: *work*, *reproduction* and *war* (Marshall, 1963).

The world of *work* as a route probably needs no explaining: stating it crudely, full-time (and, increasingly, part-time for many people) paid employment provides a contact and engagement with the external world that affords the possibility of a person becoming acknowledged as a citizen. *Reproduction*, referring literally to biological as well as to social reproduction, acknowledges the significance of experiences of family formation. Marshall's work was set in the post-war era, and so gendered social relations shaped the reproduction route to citizenship. Marshall's third route – *war* – conveys the idea of 'the soldier citizen'. If one is prepared to fight and die for one's nation, then this constitutes an obvious and direct pathway to citizenship. All three of Marshall's citizenship routes are predicated upon the existence of the nation state in which citizenship can be achieved. Workers, families and soldiers are understood unequivocally in *national* terms.

Marshall explored the historical emergence of citizenship in the context of emerging modernity from the eighteenth century onwards and subsequent industrialization and urbanization that were associated with the consolidation of modern nation states. He identified three forms of citizenship:

1. **Civil:** rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, freedom of religious worship and the right to own property.
2. **Political:** the right to participate in political processes as a member of political institutions (parliament, for example) or as an elector of those.
3. **Social:** the right to participate in the life of a society according to the standards of that society. This implies the development of education and social welfare institutions and mechanisms that can support this.

Marshall's account confers citizenship on the basis of rights rather than on other criteria. It is easy, and probably appropriate in some respects, to view Marshall's 1950s concept of citizenship as dated. It certainly fails to provide

(or challenge) an account of gender relations and other forms of inequality, or social participation (in labour market terms, for example) and his model was devised in a context where international and global circumstances had yet to really impact on ideas of citizenship (see Dean, 2007; Lister, 2003). However, it is also important to recognize its influence and acceptance as probably *the* principal form in which liberal citizenship has been construed in the second half of the twentieth century. Many people who had never heard of T.H. Marshall would have, perhaps even unconsciously, used these ideas in their beliefs about what constituted a 'good citizen' (even if they didn't describe this in citizenship terms). Marshall's work gives rise to at least two ways of thinking about citizenship within the nation state, namely citizenship as *status* (entitlements and responsibilities in the context of nation state) and citizenship as *practice* within the nation state (conduct that exemplifies the 'good citizen'). Both of these are important in relation to young people.

Over to you...

Critical research and reflection

How do the young people who you know understand their entitlements and responsibilities as citizens? Do they use the term 'citizen' and what meaning does it have for them? To what extent do they feel either empowered or disempowered by recent political changes? What impact might the progressive withdrawal of benefits or the imposition of increased higher education fees have on the capacity of young people in England and Wales to be good citizens?

How would you define the 'good citizen'? How do young people define good citizenship? How might your work and that of other educationalists and professionals contribute to this?

There is an argument here that higher education, for example, is not only about preparing students for their place in the labour market, but that it also has a vital role in cultivating the kinds of capacities and outlooks that can contribute to realizing the 'good citizen'. What contributions to this aim might other practices make (youth work, therapy or schooling, for example)?

The apparent erosion of the power of nation states suggests a weakening of the link between citizenship and the nation state as a consequence of increased diversity, the so-called 'cosmopolitan challenge' (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 191). However, as suggested, the idea of citizenship has been predicated on the existence of the nation state. So, the argument goes, you can't be a French citizen without there being a French state within which that sense of citizenship is embedded and realized. It is worth recalling Benedict Anderson's argument from Chapter 6 about the nation

state being an *imagined* entity: 'it is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign' (1991: 6). By this, Anderson means that members of such a community have to hold in their minds an image of their belongingness. Because people can never have face-to-face relations with all others in the nation (as in a localized community), imagination becomes crucial in evoking 'nation', its boundaries and its significance. The media are extremely important in creating shared representations of nationhood around and through which it becomes possible to imagine membership of a national community.

Some writers have raised the question of *global citizenship*, and the extent to which, given the processes of globalization, it might be possible to imagine being a global citizen. Castells understands this as applying to a power elite that he argues is in control of 'the space of flows'. Richard Falk, suggests that time

... partially displaces space as the essence of what the experience of global citizenship means; citizenship thereby becomes an essentially religious and normative undertaking, based on faith in the unseen, salvation in a world to come – not in heaven, but on earth – guided by convictions, beliefs and values. (Falk, 1993: 49)

Over to you...

Critically reflect on reading

You should critically reflect for a few minutes on what Falk is saying here. What are the main points that he makes? What kinds of 'religious and normative undertaking' might count towards this idea of the global citizen? What sorts of 'convictions, beliefs and values' does Falk refer to here? Can you identify any young people who may be involved in practices that might hold the promise (for them, at least) of the kind of global communion that seems to underlie Falk's position?

Falk goes on to identify four factors that underlie global citizenship.

1. Global citizenship embodies aspiration and a politics of desire: *the importance of the ultimate unity of human experience and an affective investment in this.*
2. It implies economic integration and a 'world outlook': *a world framework (for example the G20 or the UN) embodying a sense of unity.*
3. It implies consensus on environmental matters: *the primacy of appropriate energy use, resource management, protection of the environment and the acknowledgement of potential human extinction.*

4. It incorporates transnational mobilization and militancy: *the (paradoxical) anti-globalization social movements that have embodied global politics in resistance to (invariably) neoliberal politics and economics.*

According to Falk, the achievement of a citizenship of the kind envisaged would entail a number of institutional reforms:

- increased political centralization in the form of world government
- management of transnational affairs, particularly big business and entrepreneurship
- management of globalized technologies for sustainability
- the growth of regional political consciousness: new federalisms
- the growth of transnational activism: new political communities and patterns of association and the move from a preoccupation with *spatial* to *temporal* matters (that is, the future society).

As Falk readily concurs, this is highly utopian thinking but he wants to push the idea of 'politics as the art of the impossible'.

Bryan Turner (in Braham and Janes, 2002) makes some similar points. He proposes new ways of grounding citizenship on global foundations, based upon ecological concerns, aboriginal (indigenous) rights and cultural rights such as language, freedom of religion and so on. The rise of Islam or new forms of Christianity may be consistent with the latter category. 'Aboriginal rights', for Turner, encompass Australia, New Zealand and North America. The issue at stake here is *identity* for huge numbers of people whose very existence has hitherto been concealed or ignored, let alone acknowledged in citizenship terms. Environmental concerns seem to spread across the whole globe and their movements and activism are clearly global in nature (to get a sense of how this is developing, look at <http://uk.oneworld.net/guides/environmentalactivism>). It is clear that young people have been extremely active in promoting these movements and their objectives, despite appearing to be disillusioned (like many adults) with national and party political membership.

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Can you identify recent or current manifestations of claims to citizenship rights on the basis of distinct cultural identities?

There have been many examples of such claims over the last 20 years. The bloody conflict that took place in the Balkans in the 1990s was very much about the reassertion of old cultural identities that had become subsumed under the nationhood of Yugoslavia. Similar tensions emerged in Iraq between Sunni and Shia Muslims and, more recently, ethnic conflict arose in Kyrgyzstan between Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz population. The resurgence of Welsh, Irish and Scottish languages is a less dramatic example. The increasing significance and influence of Islam is a very clear assertion of cultural identity and rights that seems to be extending across the globe. Reflecting on these examples, is it possible to see Benedict Anderson's idea of the nation as 'imagined community'? How much power does this evocation of 'nationhood' have in mobilizing people in their struggles for recognition and justice, and in what specific ways can you see such ideas being disseminated? Do you think that young people might have a particular role in these struggles?

Forms of global citizenship based upon concern for the environment perhaps become increasingly tenable, as communication is made easier through the use of social networking technologies such as Twitter. Many young people are able to access these digital technologies and the capacities that inhere in them (perhaps for riot and revolution), that are often inaccessible to older generations. These capacities may displace the authority of an adult elite, creating cultural distance between generations, resulting in declining trust in some settings. However, some analysts seem to have overstated the power of these communication forms. In the 2009 social unrest in Iran, for example, some media commentators suggested that social networking had the potential to overthrow the governing regime. That did not occur and it is difficult to see many immediately positive outcomes from those protests. However, it is clear that digital technologies played a role in the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, and in sending images out of Syria in 2011 and 2012. The anti-globalization movements that have emerged over recent years are other examples. There is a substantial literature on the emergence of social movements (some of which have been predicated on ideas of citizenship) in the context of globalization and in which many young people have been involved (see, for example, Offe, 1985; Tarrow, 1998; or Halcli, 2000, for good overviews). The student movement that rapidly grew in 2010 in the UK (and just as rapidly subsided) amidst a context of prospective cuts and rises in tuition fees in higher education shared some of the features of social movements. The so-called 'new social movements' (for example the anti-capitalist movement, women's movement, or human rights movement; it is sometimes difficult to know whether to refer to single or plural) have a number of common characteristics as well as their fundamentally youth-based involvement.

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- They are collective attempts to resist or promote some form of social, cultural or political change: 'insurgent politics'.
- They are responses to the perceived inadequate capacity of existing political structures to properly represent the interests of those involved: it is often young people who initiate and participate.
- They broaden the range of what can be considered political: they depart from 'older' class-based politics.
- They are organized in loose and decentralized network forms: informal, fragmented and non-hierarchical.
- They often embody 'post-materialist' values that focus on lifestyle, environment, wellbeing and quality of life.

The literature suggests that a characteristic process underlies the life course of these movements as illustrated in Figure 7.1 (adapted from Macionis and Plummer, 2008). This model is based on 'traditional' social movements and may not always encompass the dynamic processes that accompany movements that have emerged in Castells' networked societies.




Figure 7.1 The 'natural history' of social movements

Source: Adapted from Macionis and Plummer (2008)

There are real questions about the extent to which new social movements 'coalesce': are they decentralized and do they have an existence only or mainly in virtual rather than material space, what Castells refers to as the 'new public space'? As he points out, social movements are engaged in a 'battle of images and frames, ... for minds and souls ... in multimedia communication networks' (Castells, 2009: 301–2). Castells is optimistic that social movements and 'insurgent politics' can use public space (often virtual space) in multiple ways to aim for change and autonomy by engaging in the horizontal relations that network communications promote (that is, to link with other groups and interests) and the established and mainstream

media (to promote their messages and ideas). However, this will depend, he suggests, on the preservation of a free and fair system of networked communication (that is, one that is not dominated by elite interests or subject to political control or interference) and therefore freedom and 'social change, become entwined with the institutional and organizational operation of communication networks. Communication politics becomes dependent on the politics of communication' (ibid: 302).

Despite Castells' apparent optimism, the extent to which forms of environmental, aboriginal and cultural globalization are *actually* occurring (or have occurred) through the activities of new social movements is sometimes difficult to gauge. However, Falk's and Turner's arguments are, perhaps, more utopian and focused on claims for the future rather than accurate accounts or descriptions of what is occurring in the present. For Falk, modes of global citizenship should be seen as:

... hopeful forms arising from feelings of solidarity, concerns about equity and nature, strong impulses to combine local rootedness with planetary awareness, and the underlying belief that the security and sanctity of the human community rests, in the end, on embodying an ethos of non-violence in political practices at all levels of social organization, from the family to the world. (Falk, 1993: 50)

To conclude Chapter 7, citizenship and globalization are considered specifically in relation to young people and youth.

Globalization, Citizenship and Youth

There is very obviously a sense in which the discussion of globalization considered so far relates directly to young people. They are the future of the planet; these matters are of even more significance to them than to those who are no longer young. On the other hand, the concept of citizenship seems to be distant and even irrelevant for many contemporary young people. Young people in transition between childhood and adulthood may not be able to lay claim to any form of citizenship, however the term is defined, especially as the experiences of transition become more challenging in a declining labour market.

As suggested earlier in Chapter 7, the *global* must be understood in terms of the *local*, especially in relation to young people. Chapter 3 referred to the work of Beck and Giddens and in particular to the significance of processes of individualization in globalized late modernity. It was suggested that young people's agency is increasingly experienced by them in individual terms, as the 'project of the self' or the 'choice biography'. In 'risk societies' (where futures are continuously unpredictable, as Castells and others

suggest) the capacities of flexibility and mobility are crucial if individual success and aspiration are to be realized. Recent German research shows how young people in the eastern part (post-socialist GDR) of Germany experience the consequences of global shifts and changes (in the labour market, for example) in the context of their local towns and neighbourhoods. The work of Hörschelmann and Schäfer (2005) shows the extent to which young people's access to *social capital* (networks of interpersonal relationships) and *cultural capital* positions them in their engagement with global factors that shape labour market, life and consumer opportunities.

In Hörschelmann and Schäfer's research the capacity of middle-class, well-educated young people to deal with the uncertainties that faced them was very clear. They had the capital that would support their future aspirations, or they had the capacity to develop these. They were able to envisage life as a challenge in which they would need to be open to external influences (culture, media and people, for example), to be mobile and adapt. They had acquired 'transnational capital' that would equip individuals for life in changing and international circumstances including openness to different cultures, new lifestyles and language skills. Some of the less-well educated working-class young people experienced uncertainty and change through globalizing forces as threatening and they became marginalized in their own towns or cities, aware that their skills and knowledge would not necessarily enable them to reach their aspirations. As Hörschelmann and Schäfer point out, that is partially a consequence of:

... their structural position in relation to socio-cultural and economic resources, they also receive little support from parents or youth workers to develop the skills and the confidence to deal with the threats and opportunities of 'risk society'. This is all the more worrying since staying put will unlikely be an option for them in a location where training opportunities and work are of short supply, thus posing significant risks for their personal biographies. (2005: 239)

The literature on youth, globalization and citizenship has expanded significantly in the last decade. Several writers have suggested that youth culture itself could be understood as a loose non-territorial and globalized community (Bennett, 2005: 68; Scholte, 2000: 115). Cult films, popular music, slang and fashion are clear examples. The global reach of *MTV* and derivatives provides a particular manifestation of this. The youthful aspects of anti-globalization movements, as with the 1960s peace movement and anti-war movements before them could, perhaps ironically, also be characterized as global.

However, the extent to which these *are* global is perhaps inevitably questionable. Many young people in emerging economies do not, and may never, participate in any of these 'youth solidarities', and patterns of *local*

identity and inequality discussed in Chapter 6 may be far more important to them. Perhaps this raises one of the main questions about globalization. That is, whether it can better be understood in some circumstances at least as more restricted but still *internationalized*. Nevertheless, as with the environmental and cultural developments referred to above, it is possible to imagine young people as constituting an important aspect of future global or international citizenship development. However, supra-territorial associations may have given some young people the possibility of a voice in a way that territorially based movements or organizations so often have not.

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Thinking about the arguments posed by Castells or Falk, for example, and reflecting on the work of Hörschelmann and Schäfer above, what forms of citizenship might be relevant to young people in the early twenty-first century? Given the erosion of (or changes to) the power of the nation state (and you may want to challenge that assertion), is it appropriate to teach aspects of traditional liberal citizenship in schools, based perhaps on the ideas that came from Marshall's work in the mid-twentieth century?

Thinking about young people that you know, is there a real possibility for environmental concerns to become the basis of new forms of global citizenship that might involve these young people? Thinking about the earlier distinction between citizenship as a status on the one hand (the argument about rights and entitlements as well as responsibilities) and as forms of practice on the other, what does being 'a good citizen' mean in the early twenty-first century? Are opportunities for practising good citizenship shaped by social difference in any way? Is it sometimes easier for either young men or young women to be seen as good citizens? How is this influenced by being black, white, Muslim, Christian or atheist?

Clearly, in political terms, citizenship is considered to be important (Bamber, 2010). In the UK, compulsory citizenship education has been included in the national curriculum in the context of fears about a 'democratic deficit', young people disengaging from political participation and failing to acknowledge the responsibilities of citizenship. Kymlicka offers a useful definition of this:

Citizenship education is not just a matter of learning the basic facts about the institutions and procedures of political life; it also involves acquiring a range of dispositions, virtues and loyalties that are immediately bound up with the practice of democratic citizenship. (Kymlicka, 1999: 79)

In this view, citizenship embodies rights, responsibilities *and* the capacities necessary to engage in the practices of citizenship. Citizenship education is a form of socialization into a particular normative structure. For some authors, the democratic deficit (mainly understood in terms of voter behaviour) is the symptom of a wider crisis of liberal democracy across Europe and beyond and takes us back to Castells' questions about political legitimacy (Sassen, 2006).

Less than 60% of the electorate voted in the 2001 UK general election and the governing party was elected on 25% of the total vote. Compared with other groups, young people are less likely to vote or join a political party and the under-25s are four times less likely to be registered to vote than any other group (Geddes and Rust, 2000). Bentley and Oakley found that young people withdraw from formal politics because they don't see it making 'a tangible difference to the circumstances they face; that conventional politics often does not seem to achieve the things they want [and] that they are not listened to seriously' (1999: 190). Identifying adults as the problem here, the British Youth Council argued that 'rather than young people being apathetic it is in fact the politicians and parties who are indifferent, uninterested and complacent' (in Kimberlee, 2002: 89). More recently, research by Wayne et al. (2010) explored young people's views of television news and politics. This identified young people's experience of disengagement with politics in the UK, partially as a consequence of news broadcasting doing little to connect politics with young people's lived experiences. The young people in this research were not uninterested in politics and news, but were alienated by the generally negative ways in which television news programmes represented them.

In spite of evidence of a broad lack of interest in 'ballot-box politics' (but great interest in some other politics), it is the young who are the target of active citizenship discourses and citizenship education in the UK and elsewhere. Yet this still relies on a notion of citizenship grounded in the nation state rather than in global politics and has antipathy both to youth-inspired global campaigning and types of citizenship such as those derived from alternative identities such as faith and religion. It fears both and often links the latter with terrorism. Education is a powerful socializing agent in forming young people's characters and identities and in shaping their transitions to adulthood. Following Foucault, education is understood as an institution in which the skills, knowledge and dispositions (as *power-knowledge* in aspects of curriculum) necessary for *responsible* citizenship in the liberal state are cultivated (Foucault, 1980). Taking this into account, it might be inferred that the driving force behind citizenship education is the desire to form 'ideal citizens' of the future, a practice invested in by all societies but which has had particular force in the UK and similar societies through the first part of the twenty-first century as a consequence of an

apparent democratic deficit. Ruth Lister (2005) points out that, although citizenship has been understood as an *inclusionary* mechanism it has latterly come to signify the importance of *exclusion*. Young people have characteristically been regarded as incomplete or 'deficit' citizens and, thus, politically and socially disengaged, hence the need to re-engage them through different forms of citizenship education. Youth, as a social relation as well as a stage in the life course, is that time in which claims to citizenship are themselves in states of transition. Lister suggests five broad models of citizenship.

1. **Citizenship as universal status:** this signifies membership of community or nation. A 'thin' version of this includes everyone and refers to relatively simple personhood. The 'thicker' version of citizenship entails belonging and having a sense of being part of something.
2. **Citizenship as respectable economic independence:** this version of citizenship relies on the individual's participation in the labour market and implies a degree of economic independence.
3. **Citizenship as constructive social participation:** this signals a positive relation to and stance towards community and the collective. It could include becoming involved in volunteering or some form of service and it privileges the notion of responsibility.
4. **Citizenship as a social contract:** this version of citizenship embodies discourses of rights and responsibilities. As such, it is a broadly liberal version of citizenship.
5. **Citizenship as the right to voice:** this refers to the right to have a say in what goes on and to participate in decision-making in the collective sphere.

There are considerable overlaps between these models.

Over to you...

Critical reflection

Now is a particularly apposite time to place the idea of citizenship (and global citizenship) on education agendas. If, as some of the literature indicates, the idea of national citizenship is being eroded and potentially being replaced by something transnational and even global, what are the implications for citizenship education? How could Lister's models of citizenship contribute to that?

What role might youth practitioners play in a broad approach to citizenship and citizenship education?

What does seem true is that for many young people the nation state and *the local* (in Castells' terms the 'space of places') are likely to form the space in which citizenship is experienced, although aspects of the global may penetrate this. Indeed, the specificity of place seems to be retained in the persistence of the local, and where people live 'continues to matter since people feel some sense of "being at home" in an increasingly turbulent world' (Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst, 2005: 12). For some, the fixed point of the local becomes the site of 'elective belonging' – chosen space in which to live and put down roots – and it opens up the potential for new kinds of solidarities and connections into the global world. Interestingly, this suggestion seeks *not* to counterpose local and global but rather to explore the interconnections of a range of complex constituted spaces in which citizenship identities and solidarities might be constructed and developed.

Summary and Conclusions

Sociologists are perhaps sometimes guilty of concentrating too much on change at the expense of clear analysis of constancy: how social relations endure over time. Chapter 7 has explored the paradox of a shifting yet also constant world in the context of the two concepts of globalization and citizenship.

The concept of globalization draws attention to the intersection of a range of forces: time-space compression, flows of different kinds, interdependencies and connections, expanding power networks and a convergence of global problems and interests. Although there is much argument about the extent to which there are precedents to globalization (for example the Roman Empire or English colonization of the world in the sixteenth century), it appears that *digitization* has created unprecedented capacities for the consolidation of power (for example in corporations, financial institutions and non-governmental organizations) across time and space, sometimes leading to negative economic consequences for nation states and communities (for example when capital is shifted from one location to another).

Globalization has important implications for the nature and experience of youth, in some ways *universalizing* youth through shared interests and solidarities, and in other ways *fragmenting* and differentiating youth by creating patterns of inequality in access to various economic and cultural assets. The idea of *flow* is a central motif in the literature on globalization, designating shifts of people, culture, finance and knowledge that have come to characterize the late modern world. Flows of cultural and symbolic resources (films, literature, fashion, music and ideas) running in different directions have contributed to the potential synchronization of global youth. Population flows, as the consequence of migration and asylum

seeking, are especially familiar to those living in Western cities and often result in a varied and contested multiculturalism.

Importantly, and paradoxically, globalization draws attention to the continuing significance of the *local*. Indeed, the global is inevitably experienced *through* the local (global and local form hybrids of different sorts: examples were given from African and Japanese cultural entities) and for young people especially it is within the local that they are most likely to make claims to citizenship as a form of membership and belonging. Citizenship seems to be predicated on the notion of the nation state and Chapter 7 discussed the seminal work of Marshall in this respect. Marshall's work leads to two constitutive aspects of citizenship: citizenship as forms of *entitlement* (for example social or civil) and as forms of *practice* ('good citizenship'). It is relatively easy to see how these might be enacted in the context of the nation state but matters become more complex in a globalized world. If, as some have argued, the nation state is undermined by globalization, what sorts of claims might be made for *global citizenship*? What can be shared, what opportunities exist for agency and what sources of solidarity exist in a globalized world?

For many young people (and others), the local continues to be an important setting in which transitions occur and identities are constructed. Practitioners and policymakers will have to confront the challenges faced at local level in the shifting contexts of youth and social policy in different jurisdictions: nation states and parts of nation states. However, it is in researching and theorizing the interconnections between the local and the global that sociology can offer a better understanding of the changing yet constant nature of youth.

Further Reading

- Nayak, A. (2003) *Race, Place and Globalization: Youth cultures in a changing world*, Oxford: Berg.

This book explores youth cultures emerging as a consequence of migration and settlement in the north east of England. The understanding of culture and cultural forms in terms of local/global relations is central to the arguments here.

- Roberts, K. (2009) *Youth in Transition. Eastern Europe and the West*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Roberts offers important comparisons between youth transitions in Europe, both East and West, including labour markets, leisure, families and politics.

- Shaw, S.M.I. (2010) *Parents, Children, Young People and the State*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

The end chapter on 'a risk and at risk' offers a critical approach to current negative discourses of youth in the context of underlying fears about the alleged breakdown of family life in the context of international and global welfare policy.